There have been many studies on the location of public goods where the agents are equipped with single-peaked preferences. Generally speaking, single-peakedness of preferences seems to allow for more possibilities and to lead less frequently to dictatorship (Black (1948) , Moulin (1980) , Kim and Roush (1981) , Border and Jordan (1983) , Peters et al. (1992) ). This paper deals with the problem of finding a location for a public facility on a sphere. We assume that a finite number of agents equipped with single peaked preferences, reaches a decision by voting. We show that the coordinate-wise median rule is not strategy-proof in this domain, which is in contrast with many findings in the literature. Then we prove that any strict strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. We also prove that any coalitional strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. To prove the dictatorship results we use the ultrafilter technique. Hence we show that the set of decisive coalitions is intersection closed. The problem with only strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is still open.
Introduction and model
In our collective decision problem, the set of alternatives is the unit sphere A = {x ∈ R 3 : |x| = 1} , where |.| denotes Euclidean distance. We first collect some useful facts about spherical geometry.
Some facts about spherical geometry
• The distance between two points x and y on the sphere is measured along a great circle, i.e. a circle with radius 1 and as center the origin. A greatcircles is the intersection of a plane through the origin and A. Since this distance is a monotonic transformation of Euclidean distance, we simply denote it as |x − y| .
• Observe that for every x ∈ A there is a unique point in A that has maximal distance to x (diametrically opposite); we denote this point byx, called the antipodal point of the point x.
• We denote the great circle through any two points x ∈ A and y ∈ A by G xy . If x and y are antipodal, then G xy = A.
• For a, b ∈ A (a ̸ =b) we denote the closed (shortest) arc by
For a =b ∈ A, there are infinitely many great-circles through them. Therefore, for a =b ∈ A, we define [
• For a great-circle G and a point t ∈ A \ G, (G, t) denotes the (open) hemisphere of all points of A on the same side of G as t, excluding G.
• The perpendicular bisector of a closed arc [a ⌢ b] is the great-circle that passes through the midpoint of [a ⌢ b] and is perpendicular to [a ⌢ b] ( or G ab ).
• A set C ⊆ A is convex if it contains all the arcs [x ⌢ y] joining any two points x, y ∈ C.
• The convex hull of a set X is the set Co(X) = ∩{C : X ⊆ C, C convex }.
The social choice model
Now we formulate our social choice model. The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. Each agent i ∈ N has a single-peaked preference on A, characterized by a peak p(i). So, for agent i, a point x ∈ A is weakly preferred to another point y ∈ A if and only if
with at least one strict inequality. Next we define some desirable properties of ϕ.
• ϕ is manipulable by S if there are S-deviations p, q ∈ A N , such that
where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
• ϕ is coalitional strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any T ⊆ N.
• ϕ is intermediate strategy-proof if it is not manipulable from any
• ϕ is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by singleton coalitions T.
• ϕ is strict strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N and {i}-deviations p and q,
• ϕ is intermediate strict strategy-proof if for all T and T-deviations q from a T -unanimous profile p, we have either
• ϕ is Pareto optimal if for every p ∈ A N , ϕ(p) is a Pareto optimal point for p.
Remark 1
Observe that antipodal points of the peaks can be considered as dips, where the dip d(i) of agent i ∈ N is such that x ∈ A is weakly preferred to y ∈ A if and only if
. Thus, single peaked preferences can also be viewed as single-dipped preferences.
A coalition S ⊆ N is decisive if for every t ∈ A and every profile p ∈ A N with p(i) = t for all i ∈ S we have ϕ(p) = t. If one particular agent d becomes decisive then she is called the dictator. A rule is dictatorial if there is an agent
N . We begin our study with rules satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality.
Strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality
In this section, rule ϕ is assumed to be strategy-proof and Pareto optimal.
Remark 2 Let p(i) ∈ H for all i ∈ N , where H is a hemisphere. A point t is
Pareto optimal for p if and only if t ∈ Co(P ), where
Lemma 1 Let S ⊂ N . Then S is decisive or N \ S is decisive.
Next we provide an example of a coordinatewise median rule which is Pareto optimal but not strategy-proof.
To define a spherical coordinate system, one must choose two orthogonal directions, the polar and the azimuth reference, and an origin point in space. These choices determine a reference plane that contains the origin and is perpendicular to the polar. The spherical coordinates (α, β) of a point P (see Figure 1a ) are then defined as follows: Euclidean coordinate of point P is (sin β cos α, sin β sin α, cos β) . A coordinatewise median rule F coord takes coordinates of all the peaks (α 1 , β 1 ), (α 2 , β 2 ) , . . . , (α n , β n ) and then computes medians of both the polar angles median(β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β n ) = β med and azimuth angles median (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) = α med . So, ((α 1 , β 1 ), (α 2 , β 2 ) , . . . , (α n , β n )) = (α med , β med ).
Example 1
Suppose there are three agents 1,2, and 3 with peaks at (0
• ) respectively. Corresponding Euclidean coordinates are (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0,
). Coordinate-wise median rule provides the outcome ϕ = (0, 45
)(Euclidean-coordinate). Now if agent 3 deviates and reports (90 In what follows, we show that both under strict strategy-proofness and under coalitional strategy-proofness, the set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter D on N, i.e.
N ∈ D.

for each S ⊆ N either S ∈ D or N \ S ∈ D.
for all S, T ∈ D, then S ∩ T ∈ D.
It is well-known and easy to see that an ultrafilter D contains a unique singleton {d}, so that d is a dictator.
Remark 3
Suppose V and W are decisive coalitions and V ∩ W is not decisive. Then, by Lemma 
are decisive. We use this fact in the following proofs. Proof. To the contrary assume that V ∩ W is not decisive. X, Y , and Z are defined as Remark 3. Consider a profile p such that,
. a, b and c are chosen to be equidistant on a great-circle. Next we show that
(1)
Suppose ϕ(p) = a, then equation (3) 
Consider a sequence of points {d k } ∞ k=1 ∈ G 2 converging to a. As G 2 is compact we may assume that for some subsequence of
Without loss of generality we may assume that the original sequence does so. Now, 
